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Textual Privacy and Mobile Information
SIMON STERN*
The Supreme Court of Canada’s decision in R v Marakah attempted to resolve the privacy
status of text messages under section 8 of the Charter, but offered an incomplete solution
because it failed to address the normative basis for protecting such communications. Despite
the complexity of section 8 analysis (which itself is a product of multiple and inconsistent
tests used to answer the same questions), the privacy of text messages allows for a relatively
simple analysis. Normatively speaking, letters, email, and text messages all attract the
same basic privacy interest, and should be treated analogously. However, if the police
have objective grounds for believing that particular individuals have been exchanging text
messages in furtherance of a crime, reasonable suspicion may justify a limited search,
aimed solely at obtaining those messages. This approach protects the public from random
and baseless police searches while giving the police access to these communications when
there are objective grounds to believe they will disclose evidence of crime.
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ALTHOUGH EMAIL AND TEXTING are no longer particularly novel forms of

communication, the questions they pose for the law of search and seizure
continue to create difficulties for the courts. These difficulties are particularly
acute when the prosecution seeks to use electronic communications as evidence
in criminal cases. The discussion in this article focuses on what I will call “mobile
information”—text messages, email, and similar transmissions which, having
been created to travel across media, are not embedded uniquely in a single
physical device but may be found in various places outside of the sender’s custody
or control, such as on the phone or computer of the addressee or a further
recipient, or on a restricted or open-access web site. When obtained from any
source, through a duly authorized search or in circumstances where no search has
occurred, such evidence does not present difficult questions about admissibility.
But when the police acquire mobile evidence during an unauthorized search of
the recipient, the question arises whether the sender has a privacy interest in
the information itself that justifies excluding the evidence, even though it was
not obtained from the claimant. If mobile information is taken from a device
that belongs to the claimant, through an unauthorized search, its mobility is
insignificant: The privacy interest in the device covers any information extracted
during the search. When the device belongs to a third party, on the other hand,
it matters fundamentally whether the claimant has a privacy interest in the
information itself. In what follows, I propose a framework for evaluating such
privacy claims.
The framework proposed here differs, in some fundamental respects, from
the one adopted by the Supreme Court of Canada in R v Marakah.1 Marakah
involved an unauthorized search of a co-conspirator’s iPhone in the course of an
investigation for conspiracy to engage in illegal firearms sales. The police, having
obtained a warrant to search the suspects’ homes, seized Marakah’s Blackberry
and the iPhone of his co-accused, and found incriminating text messages on both
devices. The warrants were held to be invalid, but the application judge admitted
the text messages, and both men were convicted.2 Marakah argued that he had
an ongoing privacy interest in the text messages, even after their delivery, but
the trial and appellate courts rejected that contention.3 In a majority opinion by
Chief Justice McLachlin, the Court reversed the lower court decisions, adopting
Marakah’s view. However, the Court made no effort to analogize text messages to
other forms of written communication, thereby failing to address the normative
1.
2.
3.

R v Marakah, 2017 SCC 59, 42 CR (7th) 1 [Marakah].
Ibid at paras 2, 3.
See R v Marakah, 2016 ONCA 542, 131 OR (3d) 561 [Marakah, ONCA].
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basis for the privacy interest in question. Instead, the majority drew on three
considerations in a fashion that aims to establish a privacy interest in text messages
as a general matter, but in effect leaves open the possibility that in a given case,
the particular circumstances may eradicate that interest.
First as to the “place” of the search, the Court observed that text messaging,
no matter where it occurs, can serve to “create private chat rooms between
individuals,”4 and that when it does, this factor supports the sender’s privacy
interest. Nevertheless, the Court recognized that texting does not always occur
within a secluded zone, and concluded that “different facts may well lead to a
different result.”5 “Place,” then, may enhance or diminish the sender’s privacy
interest, depending on the circumstances.6 Second, as to the sender’s “control”
over the object of the search, the Court stated that after the message has been
delivered, the sender’s privacy interest may persist by virtue of her “shared
control” over it, as when someone shares control over their office computer with
an employer who also has access to it.7 The better answer, however, is that control
has little significance in this analysis, just as it does when the police are searching
for letters. People generally cannot control what the recipient does with a letter,
but the sender’s privacy interest does not vanish upon delivery: The police are
not free to seize letters, on a warrantless basis, from any of the places where they
might be found.8 That answer would help to show why text messages generally
attract a privacy interest—the point that Marakah seeks to establish. Basing
that interest on the sender’s persisting control, instead, has the undesirable effect
of conceding that where the Crown can show definitively that such control is
lacking, the privacy interest wanes.
4.
5.

6.

7.
8.

Ibid at para 28 [emphasis omitted].
Marakah, supra note 1 at para 55. As the Court explained, “messages posted on social
media, … [or] in crowded Internet chat rooms, or … on online message boards” do not
attract a privacy interest; more generally, various factual circumstances, relating to how
and where the message is sent or read, can also eliminate the privacy interest (ibid). A vast
array of contingencies that may have that effect, and so the possibility of “a different result”
necessarily depends on the facts of the case (ibid).
One might read Marakah as making this point directly—as, for instance, when the Court
observes that “[t]he place of the search is simply one of several factors that must be weighed”
(ibid at para 30). However, given that the Court singled out three factors for discussion,
rather than reviewing all of the potentially relevant factors to separate the inconclusive ones
from the others, the Court evidently meant to confer on these three a significance that
the others lacked.
Ibid at para 42 (likening the “shared control aspect of this case” to one of an employee
whose “employer … could [also] access the contents of the computer”). The sender of a text
message, however, does not necessarily have any access to the recipient’s device.
For further discussion, see the text accompanying notes 78-80 below.
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Last, the Court observed that because text messages can “reveal[] a great deal
of private information,”9 this factor also supports a continuing privacy interest.
Here, the Court comes closest to setting out a normative justification, but stops
short, instead making a descriptive statement about the messages’ content.10
Notice that postcards do not typically reveal highly intimate personal details,
and yet most people would not consider them any more open than letters to
random search, if the police seize them without legal authorization from the
recipient’s briefcase or residence—nor has any Canadian court ruled otherwise.11
Conversely, credit card transactions may be highly revealing, and yet no Canadian
court has ruled that they attract a strong privacy interest, as a general matter.12
The likelihood of revealing personal information, however important, does
not seem to be the crucial feature. Marakah relies on two factors—place and
control—that yield variable results, depending on the circumstances, and one
factor that cannot, by itself, establish a normative ground for a general privacy
interest in text messages.
In this article, I propose such an account, drawing on the similar social
norms relating to various forms of written communication. In brief, I suggest
that text messages cannot be normatively differentiated from letters, and that
they both carry a certain basic privacy interest on the sender’s part, because that
9. Marakah, supra note 1 at para 37.
10. In so doing, the majority misconstrues Marshall McLuhan’s famous observation that “the
medium is the message,” ibid at para 33 quoting Marshall McLuhan, Understanding Media:
The Extensions of Man (New York: McGrawHill, 1964) at 7. As McLuhan explained, “it is the
medium that shapes and controls the scale and form of human association and action” (ibid
at 9). McLuhan’s point was that the same content carries a different meaning, when read in
the paper, or heard on the radio, or seen on the television (or, he might have added, read on
the internet) because those different media shape and control content in different ways. But
the Marakah majority takes this in precisely the opposite fashion, reasoning that the content
is the message, and that it thereby determines the significance of the medium. According
to the Court, “[t]he medium of text messaging broadcasts a wealth of personal information
capable of revealing personal and core biological information,” and this tendency to convey
private content helps to establish a privacy interest in the medium that conveys it (Marakah,
supra note 1 at para 33). This may be a sound legal conclusion, but McLuhan offers no help
in establishing it.
11. There is little jurisprudence concerning protection for postcards, but see Justice Michelle
Fuerst, Michal Fairburn & Scott Fenton, “Warrantless search of cell phone text messages
may violate message sender’s reasonable expectation of privacy” (16 October 2015),
Insider (blog), online: Thomson Reuters <www.westlawnextcanada.com/blog/insider/
police-powers-expectation-of-privacy-466> (commenting on R v Pelucco, 2015 BCCA 370,
376 BCAC 226 [Pelucco], and observing that “post card[s] [and] letter[s]” generally attract an
expectation of privacy).
12. For further discussion, see the text accompanying note 42 below.
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is an interest “that society is prepared to recognize as ‘reasonable.’”13 That basic
privacy interest is sufficient to protect against random and groundless searches.
The police are no more entitled to undertake baseless, large-scale searches of
mobile phones, in the hope of finding text messages that would incriminate the
sender, than to undertake searches for any other form of written correspondence
to acquire documents that incriminate the sender. The interests that animate
privacy rights generally in this area—the autonomy, integrity, and dignity
interests of individuals in a free and democratic society14—would be radically
eroded if people had to assume that whenever they communicate with others,
the content is presumptively open to random search by the police, unsupported
by any articulable justification, whenever the content is preserved in a form that
persists after the communication has been received.
Nevertheless, I suggest, the situation is very different when the police have
reasonable suspicion to believe that certain individuals are involved in a serious
crime. “A ‘reasonable’ suspicion means something more than a mere suspicion
and something less than a belief based upon reasonable and probable grounds.”15
Like the higher standard, however, it must be “based on objectively discernible
facts.”16 Courts have used the standard of reasonable suspicion to permit limited
searches, such as a frisk or pat-down.17 Analogously, this may provide a sufficient
basis for a search of the recipient’s mobile device, aimed specifically at yielding the
text messages relevant to the crime, and focused on obtaining only those messages.
In Part I, I show why questions of informational privacy, unlike most
other varieties, have traditionally been hard to answer categorically, under the
Court’s jurisprudence, and have often been answered contingently—which is
to say that particular examples are often analyzed individually when challenged
in court. As a result, both the public and the police may have great difficulty
ascertaining the privacy interest that attaches to a given item (e.g., an email or
a text message), leaving the public unsure about their rights, and frustrating the
ability of the police to do their jobs effectively. In Marakah, the Court sought to
offer a categorical solution to the treatment of text messages, but the decision
13. R v M(A), 2008 SCC 19 at para 33, [2008] 1 SCR 569 citing Katz v United States, 389 US
347 (1967) [Katz].
14. See e.g. Hunter v Southam, [1984] 2 SCR 145 at 159, 11 DLR (4th) 641 [Hunter]; R v Plant,
[1993] 3 SCR 281 at 293, 157 NR 321 [Plant].
15. R v Kang-Brown, 2008 SCC 18 at para 75, [2008] 1 SCR 456 [Kang-Brown].
16. R v Chehil, 2013 SCC 49 at para 26, [2013] 3 SCR 220 [Chehil].
17. See e.g. R v Solomon, 2014 ONSC 6857 at para 88, 118 WCB (2d) 259; R v Atkins, 2013
ONCA 586 at paras 14-15, 210 OAC 397; R v Tyndale, 2010 ONSC 1744 at paras 105-06,
208 CRR (2d) 272.
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does not achieve this effect, unless the “personal information” strand of the
analysis has the power, by itself, to resolve the question. In further elaboration
of this problem, I then distinguish, in Part II, between spatial and informational
privacy, both as a general matter, and more specifically with respect to the Court’s
jurisprudence. Next, in Part III, I turn to the Court’s privacy jurisprudence,
focusing specifically on two of the prevailing tests, set out in Edwards and Plant.
Part III also confronts the “lack of control” theory adopted by some courts, and
by the dissent in Marakah. On that view, once the sender loses control over
the message, the privacy interest accordingly vanishes. The majority in Marakah
evaded this argument, reasoning that the sender and recipient may have “shared
control” over the message.18 But that answer seems to concede that without such
control, the sender has no privacy interest. As will become evident, this theory
crumbles upon scrutiny, because once we look to the social norms concerning
written correspondence, we see that control is not a very significant consideration
when assessing the sender’s privacy interest. Finally, in Part IV, I turn to the
normative grounds for concluding that individuals have a reasonable expectation
of privacy in text messages, but I show, in Part IV(B), how the standard of
“reasonable suspicion” may be applied so as to permit the police limited access to
only those text messages for which there are objectively ascertainable grounds to
believe that they were exchanged in furtherance of a crime.
In the ensuing discussion, I consider an array of problems arising in this area,
but I focus on informational privacy in text messages—an issue that accentuates,
with unusual clarity, the problem of the categorical and the contingent. To show
why, and to specify more precisely the questions these cases raise, it will help to
describe a common scenario—essentially the one that arose in Marakah. Having
identified several suspects in a conspiracy to sell or distribute contraband, the
police proceed to search them. The incriminating evidence that emerges includes
text messages relating to the conspiracy, sent between the suspects. It eventually
transpires that legal authorization to obtain the messages was lacking—either
because they were outside the scope of an authorized search, or because the
police acted without a valid warrant and without a valid exception to the
warrant requirement. Nevertheless, when each suspect moves to exclude that
evidence, the prosecution responds that none of them may contest the search of
another’s phone; thus a message sent from A to B, and retrieved from B’s phone,
is admissible against A. The defendants reply that a reasonable expectation
of privacy accompanies all text messages no matter where they travel, and
that because there was no legal authorization for the search, the messages are
18. See the text accompanying supra note 7 above.
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inadmissible. Formerly, the prosecution would have replied that no one has
any reasonable expectation of privacy in a text message. Now, after Marakah,
the prosecution would assert that the accused has no privacy interest in these
particular text messages (so long as any of the factors singled out in Marakah tilt
in the other direction). Thus the defence would propose a categorical answer and
the prosecution would reply that the analysis is contingent—i.e., that it depends
on the particular circumstances of the case.

I. THE CATEGORICAL AND THE CONTINGENT
To make sense of the legal landscape in this area, it will help to begin by
distinguishing between two kinds of problems that arise in the law of search
and seizure. Some of these problems can be resolved categorically and others—
under the existing jurisprudence—tend to be resolved contingently. The concern
to balance privacy and security prompts the courts, when considering the
legitimacy of a search, to undertake a complex multifactor analysis that includes
a careful and measured appraisal of each component, and that often turns on
contentious claims about objectively justified understandings of privacy.19 This
elaborate and nuanced approach is best suited for questions that can be answered
categorically—that is, questions about the privacy interest in places or things,

19. See e.g. Katz, supra note 19 at 361 (“[T]here is a twofold requirement, first that a person
have exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy and, second, that the expectation
be one that society is prepared to recognize as ‘reasonable’”) (Harlan J, concurring);
R v Patrick, 2009 SCC 17 at para 17, [2009] 1 SCR 579 [Patrick]. On the contentious
nature of these ascriptions, consider, e.g., the observation that “[p]rivacy analysis is laden
with value judgments which are made from the independent perspective of the reasonable
and informed person who is concerned about the long-term consequences of government
action for the protection of privacy” (ibid at para 14). The disputable nature of these
judgments was demonstrated long ago in a study revealing widespread disagreement between
the US Supreme Court and the public as to the extent of the privacy interest in various
activities that have figured in the jurisprudence. See Christopher Slobogin & Joseph E
Schumacher, “Reasonable Expectations of Privacy and Autonomy in Fourth Amendment
Cases: An Empirical Look at ‘Understandings Recognized and Permitted by Society’” (1993)
42:4 Duke LJ 727.
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such as lockers, backpacks, and mobile phones, as a class.20 When such a question
arises for the first time and a court conducts a balancing analysis, the result is to
specify the privacy interest in all members of the class. When the question next
arises, rather than having to inquire anew into the totality of circumstances, the
court need only refer to the categorical answer supplied earlier.
That categorical answer has the great advantage of yielding a bright-line rule
for the police and the public. Because the first backpack case effectively deals with
virtually all future cases (subject to various exceptions that also apply generally
in the law of search and seizure), the decision enables people to assess, with a
fair degree of accuracy, whether a prospective search of a backpack would be
legally valid, and on what grounds. Where the courts can deliver a categorical
answer, specifying the privacy protection that applies to lockers, curbside garbage
bags, and heat patterns,21 the balancing test yields the same kind of result as any
other precedential opinion that tells individuals how to direct their conduct in
accordance with the law, how they may legitimately expect to be treated, and what
would count as a legal violation. The result is to inform the public about their
privacy rights in a clear and comprehensible fashion, and to provide guidance to
the police, whose ability to do their job effectively depends on the availability of
reliable bright-line rules.
But although the Court has emphasized that questions of privacy “must
be framed in broad and neutral terms,”22 it has crafted jurisprudence that
makes categorical answers difficult in some contexts. Some questions about the
validity of a search are answered contingently, not categorically, and in these
cases the balancing test is not very helpful in informing the public or in guiding
the conduct of the police. This has been a persistent difficulty in the area of
informational privacy—and remains so even after Marakah. To ask what privacy
interest attaches to email or text messages, for instance, under the existing
20. See R v Buhay, 2003 SCC 30 at paras 18-24, [2003] 1 SCR 631 [Buhay] (lockers); R v M(A),
supra note 13 at paras 61-65 (backpacks); R v Fearon, 2014 SCC 77 at paras 51-58, [2014]
3 SCR 621 [Fearon] (cell phones). Notice that in “reject[ing] the idea that s. 8 of the Charter
categorically precludes any search of a cell phone seized incidental to a lawful arrest” (ibid
at para 64), the Court was refusing to adopt a categorical exclusion from an exception to the
warrant requirement, not refusing to make a categorical statement about the nature of the
privacy interest in cell phones.
21. See supra note 6 and the accompanying text. See also Patrick, supra note 19 (garbage bags);
R v Tessling, 2004 SCC 67, [2004] 3 SCR 432 [Tessling] (heat patterns).
22. R v M(A), supra note 13 at para 70 quoting R v Wong, [1990] 3 SCR 36 at 50, 120 NR
34 [Wong]. See also R v M(A), supra note 13 at paras 116, 120; Kang-Brown, supra note
15 at para 138 quoting Wong, ibid at 50; R v Buhay, supra note 20 at para 19 quoting
Wong, ibid at 50.
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jurisprudence, is to ask the wrong question: The multifactor balancing test yields
answers that apply to particular examples rather than to the class as a whole.
Asking what privacy interest someone has in a text message is like asking the same
question about a conversation. It is difficult to answer as a general matter because
a given conversation could fall anywhere along the spectrum of privacy interests,
depending on factors such as who was present and where the conversation took
place.23 For example, in the case that introduced the balancing test to this area of
law—a case involving an unauthorized recording of a call placed from a public
phone booth—the Court emphasized that the defendant had “shut[] the door
behind him,” and this act turned the booth into a “temporarily private place.”24
A door left open could yield a different result. The same considerations apply to
text messages. Thus, in Marakah, the Court distinguished between messages that
are shielded from others’ eyes and messages that are readily visible to others, i.e.,
between messages over which the sender retains “shared control” after delivery
and those for which such control is lacking.25 As I will argue in Part III(C) below,
a different rationale for protecting text messages—based on social norms—would
yield a more clearly categorical solution.
Given that the contingent problems must be resolved after the fact,
on a case-by-case basis, the predictive value of any particular legal decision for law
enforcement officers, and for the public, is limited, because the ex post balancing
analysis may apply differently in another case with slightly different features.
A workable solution to this privacy question must be one that allows for a certain
amount of reliable assessment ex ante—a solution that strives, provisionally,
to offer categorical answers where practically possible, without altering the
structure of a jurisprudential arrangement that provides for contingent answers
23. Thus, although some courts have likened text messaging to conversations with the aim of
showing why both should generally be viewed as highly private, the analogy merely restates
the problem rather than resolving it. See e.g. Marakah, ONCA, supra note 3 at paras
109, 111 (“[A] typical exchange of text messages … is essentially a modern version of a
conversation and can contain as much private information as an oral conversation” [emphasis
added]) (LaForme J, dissenting). Even if an electronic or oral exchange reveals private
information, it may fail to attract a privacy interest because of the circumstances in which it
took place. Hence, so long as that interest depends on “the totality of circumstances,” and
those circumstances must be ascertained for any given example, the analogy does not have
the categorical force seemingly attributed to it. Courts pursuing this analogy usually cite
R v Telus Communications Co, 2013 SCC 16 at para 5, [2013] 2 SCR 3 (in which the Court
noted that “[t]ext messaging is, in essence, an electronic conversation”); however, for the
reasons just given, the analogy marks the beginning of an analysis, not the end of one.
24. Katz, supra note 13 at 517 (Harlan J, concurring).
25. See supra note 7 and the accompanying text.
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whenever appropriate. Consider phone booths again: To say that they are treated
differently, depending on whether the door is open or closed, goes a long way
towards the ex ante guidance that a categorical rule would offer. Not all questions
of informational privacy can be resolved in this fashion, but there are some means
of managing these problems in ways that tilt more towards the categorical.
To raise this point is not to suppose that the courts should prefer an approach
that gives the police readier access to more information on a relatively low
standard; a workable solution is one that tells the police clearly what is permitted
and what is prohibited. A doctrine that serves to deprive the police of warrantless
access to nearly all text messages—as Marakah aims to do—is a significant
improvement over the prior jurisprudence, which evaluated the privacy interest
in each message ex post. Providing guidance does not require that investigations
must be as easy as possible; rather, it requires clarifying in advance, as much as
possible, what the police may lawfully search and what is off limits. In what
follows, I will suggest an approach that takes precisely this form: By adopting a
requirement of reasonable suspicion as to certain objectively specifiable features
of the text messages in question and the circumstances surrounding them, the
courts would deprive the police of warrantless and groundless access to most
text messages—including some that are open to warrantless scrutiny, under
Marakah—while affording warrantless but justified access if the police can show
that they have sufficient grounds to believe that the particular messages they seek
to obtain were related to specific criminal activities. In these cases, the basis for
the search, though insufficient for a warrant, is strong enough to ensure that
the police are not using random fishing expeditions to acquire incriminating
evidence. Before developing that approach, however, I will explain the currently
applicable doctrine in more detail.
In an area where those who are guided by the law must often make quick
decisions using limited information, clarity and predictability are particularly
important. Their absence generates significant costs in terms of misdirected
or needlessly duplicative police efforts, lost prosecution opportunities as well
as ill-advised prosecutions, and risky and expensive information-gathering
techniques that are adopted because of uncertainty about cheaper and safer
alternatives. The framework proposed in this article is aimed at yielding clarity
and predictability, without eliminating or reducing the basic privacy interest
at issue. Categorical solutions also pose some danger because they operate so
bluntly; however, they have the great virtue of applying in a “broad and neutral”
fashion,26 allowing the police and citizens alike to tell how a privacy interest is
26. See supra note 22 and the accompanying text.
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likely to attach. Contingent solutions are much more dangerous, because they
can make rights opaque and uncertain. Perhaps there can be no perfect solution,
but the one suggested in this article strives for a more categorical approach,
capable of allowing a reasonable ex ante assessment of privacy rights.

II. SPACE, INFORMATION, AND PRIVACY
Although courts never tire of repeating the truism that constitutional limits on
search and seizure “protec[t] people, not places,”27 many of the easy questions in
this area are easy precisely because they involve places for which the applicable
privacy interest can indeed be specified categorically.28 It is when the question
relates not to places, but to information conveyed by one individual to another,
that the emphasis on “people” becomes greater and the answers become harder.
Consider the following examples involving places. Someone driving on the street
or making a purchase at the drugstore is acting in public, and, because of the
location, cannot invoke a constitutional privacy interest to keep law enforcement
officers from observing this conduct.29 Someone at an airport or border crossing
has a diminished privacy interest because of the location.30 Residences, backpacks,
and lockers are all entitled to constitutional solicitude because the courts have
regarded them as spaces of a certain type—intimate, sealed—such that the owner
has a right against unauthorized intrusion. These cases are easily resolvable insofar
as they address the privacy interest in a particular kind of space: When it is seen
as a personal and enclosed alcove, it receives more privacy protection, and when
it is seen as open and public, it receives less.
Analogously, when evaluating privacy protection for mobile phones,
courts have often likened them to places. For a good while, courts afforded

27. Hunter, supra note 14 at para 159 quoting Katz, supra note 13 at 351.
28. As Professor David Alan Sklansky notes, the US Supreme Court has continued to “read
the Fourth Amendment to provide protections that are place-specific,” and this practice of
“[t]ying reasonable expectations of privacy to special, constitutionally protected places has
seemed to drain Katz of much of its significance.” See David Alan Sklansky, “‘One Train May
Hide Another’: Katz, Stonewall, and the Secret Subtext of Criminal Procedure” (2007) 41:3
UC Davis L Rev 875 at 884-85.
29. See e.g. R v Felger, 2014 BCCA 34 at paras 46, 52, 350 BCAC 53: “The ‘search’ occurred in a
retail premises that was open to the public … there was no reasonable expectation of privacy
in the retail premises.”
30. See e.g. Kang-Brown, supra note 15 at para 45: “The security measures taken at airports have
of necessity resulted in a diminished expectation of privacy in that setting.”
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them little protection if they were not “locked” (i.e., password-protected),31
but more recently the Court has repudiated that conclusion while nevertheless
preserving the analogy:
Like the private sphere of the home, our digital devices remain intensely personal,
even when we do not take every possible precaution to protect them. An individual
who leaves her front door unlocked does not forfeit her privacy interest in her home
to the state; the same is true of her phone.32

The emphasis on “personal” details, which might seem to call attention to the
subject matter rather than the location, quickly gives way to a spatial analogy. The
recognition that spatial analogies support categorical answers may explain why
the Court in Marakah held that the “place” of the search is a factor that supports
the sender’s privacy interest, even while acknowledging that “an electronic
conversation does not occupy a particular physical place,”33 and that when
electronic messages and conversations are visible to others, the conceptual wall
that creates a “zone of privacy” dissolves, and the sender’s privacy interest erodes.34
Other privacy problems, currently treated as categorical, might yet drift
into the realm of the contingent, and these problems typically feature liminal
spaces—usually spaces that border ambiguously on the domestic. Heat patterns
emanating from a residence are, at present, treated as a fairly blunt information
source, incapable of revealing specific and granular details about the activity
inside a building. According to the Court, a forward-looking infrared camera
(FLIR) can measure only the total quantum of electricity being consumed, and
so cannot convey information about the inhabitants’ personal habits—at least
not in a way that would reveal “biographical core” information.35 But that could
change, for example, if the technology becomes capable of isolating the particular
31. See e.g. R v Belcourt, 2012 BCSC 229 at para 32, [2013] BCWLD 3351: “[N]one of the
items seized … including the cell phone [were] … locked, in such a way as to indicate that
the owner or possessor maintained a reasonable expectation of privacy in it”; R v Thompson,
2013 ONSC 4624 at para 44, 113 WCB (2d) 741: “[A]s the cell phone was neither locked
nor password protected, the police were at liberty to conduct a cursory search of the phone to
ascertain if it contained evidence relevant to the alleged crime.”
32. R v Fearon, supra note 20 at para 160.
33. Marakah, supra note 1 at para 28.
34. Ibid at para 37.
35. Tessling, supra note 21 at para 62: “The information generated by FLIR imaging about the
respondent does not touch on ‘a biographical core of personal information,’ nor does it
‘ten[d] to reveal intimate details of [his] lifestyle’ … . It shows that some of the activities in
the house generate heat.” Cf Kyllo v US, 533 US 27 (2001) at 38: “The Agema Thermovision
210 might disclose … at what hour each night the lady of the house takes her daily sauna
and bath—a detail that many would consider ‘intimate.’”
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room where electricity is being used or the kind of device at work. Under such
circumstances, the Court might revisit the question and conclude that each
time the police wish to record that information, their request must be assessed
individually—not as a generic instance of FLIR measurement, but as a particular
intrusion whose legality requires an individuated balancing analysis.
Courts have also addressed the privacy interest in garbage bags by dwelling
on spatial considerations, and here again, one may discern a certain kind of
hesitation about the answer, because of the bags’ liminal location. The contents
of a trash bag may, of course, reveal “biographical core” information, and yet
the Court has treated the issue categorically, holding that when people leave
garbage at the curb to be collected, they “intend[] to abandon [their] proprietary
interest in the physical objects,” thereby rendering the contents open to police
inspection without any need to articulate a justification for the search.36 The
Court took some pains to rationalize its holding in spatial terms, explaining that
only after “the garbage [has been] placed at or within reach of the lot line, [can] the
householder … be said to have unequivocally abandoned it”37 By this logic, the
differing privacy interests that would otherwise attach individually to each of the
various contents within the bag are all effaced once it has been placed in a certain
location. Although the Court analyzed the problem in spatial terms to generate
a categorical answer, Justice Abella concurred separately, noting that garbage
bags “may contain the most intensely personal and private information about
ourselves,”38 and proposing that they should be “protect[ed] from indiscriminate
state intrusion”—that is, the kind of groundless search that the police may
conduct whenever a reasonable expectation of privacy is lacking.39 I will return
to this point later; for the moment, it is sufficient to observe that these concerns
do not arise when someone uses a public trash can. In those cases, there is no
dispute that the act of discarding an item allows the police to seize it without any
articulable cause, and no one has suggested that reasonable suspicion should be

36. Patrick, supra note 19 at para 54; Compare the rejoinder of Justice Abella: “What we
inelegantly call ‘garbage’ may contain … intensely personal and private information”
(ibid at para 76).
37. Ibid at para 62 [emphasis added]. Contrast R v Roy, 2010 BCCA 448 at para 22, 295
BCAC 191 (“[W]here a person is asked to consent to a search of the trash while it is still
located within the home, the person is essentially being asked to consent to an otherwise
unconstitutional search”).
38. Patrick, supra note 19 at para 76.
39. Ibid at para 77 [emphasis added].
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required.40 The disagreement, then, arises because of the liminal space around
the home, not because of the inherent potential for garbage to include highly
personal information.
Finally, some questions are answered contingently, because they do not relate
to places. Credit card purchases, chat room exchanges, email—each of these,
under the existing jurisprudence, might attract a greater or lesser privacy interest
depending on the subject matter, the way the transaction is conducted, or the
involvement of others. In R v Siemens, for example, the Provincial Court of
Saskatchewan applied the multifactor balancing test to conclude that although
the accused might have had a “subjective expectation of privacy” in a credit card
transaction involving a car rental, the information it recorded did “not reveal
intimate details of his lifestyle or his personal choices,”41 and consequently the
court was “not satisfied … that the accused had a reasonable expectation of
privacy in [that] information.”42 Conversely, in R v Pheasant, the Ontario Court
of Justice observed that individuals “have a reasonable expectation of privacy in
their own banking and credit card records,” evidently because, when collected in
the aggregate, such records could reveal “biographical core” details that a more
carefully delimited search would not disclose.43 Again, in R v Kwok, the Ontario
Court of Justice held that the claimant had no privacy interest in conversations
taking place in “a chat room to which many people subscribed and spoke,” but
did have a privacy interest once he “move[d] to [a] private chat room,” because
that “change[d] the nature of the communication and ma[d]e it a private
communication.”44 When questions of informational privacy are not answered
40. See e.g. R v D(B), 2011 ONCA 51 at para 14, 273 OAC 241 (“I cannot see how B.D.
could have any reasonable expectation of privacy in the documentation she left, discarded,
in a store frequented by the general public”); R v Marini, 71 WCB (2d) 727, 2005
CarswellOnt 9228 (WL Can) at paras 7, 17 (Sup Ct) (no expectation of privacy in ginger ale
cans “seized from a recycling container in the public hallway” and “from a men’s washroom
provided for use by the public”); R v Delaa, 2006 CarswellAlta 2466 (WL Can) at para 124,
[2006] AJ No 948 (QL) (QB) (accused was “in a public parking lot of a service station,
and [he] cavalierly disposed of the gum in a manner that could not have carried with it any
expectation of privacy or secure disposal”).
41. R v Siemens, 2011 SKPC 57 at paras 29, 52, 374 Sask R 193 [Siemens].
42. Ibid at para 55. See also R v Okubadejo, [2008] OJ 4732 (QL) at para 22, 2008 CarswellOnt
7039 (WL Can) (Sup Ct) (the accused had no reasonable expectation of privacy in a
particular record of a “credit card transaction … seized by police from a gas station” at para
1); R v Stymiest, 2006 NBQB 160 at paras 23, 46, 304 NBR (2d) 200 (the accused had
no reasonable expectation of privacy in the particular travel expense claims and credit card
charges that the police had acquired on a warrantless basis).
43. R v Pheasant (2000), 48 WCB (2d) 75 at para 55, 2001 GTC 3427 (Ont Ct J) [Pheasant].
44. R v Kwok, 78 WCB (2d) 21, [2008] OJ 2414 at para 22 (Ct J).
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by reference to spatial considerations (as with the curbside garbage bags), the
analysis tends to proceed through a careful examination of the challenged records
or documents, involving the particular features of each.
Notice that these cases could be resolved categorically: For instance,
in Siemens the court might have ruled (as Pheasant did) that because of general
capacity for credit card records to reveal highly personal details, they are
categorically protected, and it made no difference that the particular record in
question conveyed no intimate information. Marakah, as we have seen, proposes
a categorical solution to the treatment of text messages, but in so doing, draws
on factors that could yield “different result[s]” depending on the circumstances.45
To sum up, in virtually every case involving privacy in a place or thing
(backpacks, cell phones, garbage left at the curb), the analysis has, in effect, been
conducted ex ante by means of a legal decision that addresses that category. Even
when a later court (evaluating the validity of a warrantless backpack search, for
example) makes a point of applying the balancing test, comparing the case at hand
to the precedential one, the procedure is essentially mechanical, simply designed
to reiterate and confirm the logic of the controlling precedent, not to find out
whether it can be replicated (as with repetitions of scientific experiments).46 That
courts were content, for so long, to resolve disputes in this area of the law by
attending to places rather than people, suggests that the privacy problems flowing
from mobile information remained comparatively inconspicuous for most of the
twentieth century, making a spatial and categorical solution plausible. Indeed,
Katz v United States, the decision that sponsored the turn away from places and
towards people as the objects of legal protection, was also the case that produced
the “totality of the circumstances” test as a byproduct.47 Just as privacy questions
that have mainly to do with protected spaces are usually answered categorically,
those that are not readily understood in spatial terms are often taken to require
the more thoroughgoing and individuated analysis that Katz introduced. Let
us turn, then, to the most frequently invoked versions of the balancing test in
Canadian jurisprudence.

45. See note 5 and accompanying text above.
46. For a valuable comparison between these two methods of repetition and evaluation, see Mary
M Kennedy, “Generalizing from Single Case Studies” (1979) 3:4 Evaluation Q 661.
47. Katz, supra note 13.
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III. TWO PRIVACY FRAMEWORKS
Canadian courts have fashioned various tests for evaluating the privacy interests
that may protect individuals from an unauthorized search; two of the most
prominent were set out in R v Edwards and R v Plant48 (I put aside the version
sometimes attributed to R v Tessling and sometimes to R v Spencer, which
redescribes the Edwards test at a greater level of abstraction).49 The version in
Edwards functions generically, with an implicit assumption that the typical
dispute involves a contestation over the privacy interest in a place or physical
object, while the version in Plant focuses particularly on informational privacy.
Thus, if a new question arises as to the privacy interest in a certain kind of
space, the analysis should proceed under Edwards (or perhaps Spencer, or both)
whereas if such a question arises as to informational privacy, the analysis should
also proceed under Plant. The availability of several different tests, however, has
created some inconsistency in the law: Courts have used nearly every possible
combination of the three tests (using one, two, and rarely all three of the above)
in the checkerboard array of cases confronting questions of informational privacy.
A. EDWARDS AND PLANT

Edwards set out a seven-factor test for assessing the “totality of the circumstances”
bearing on a claimant’s privacy interest, though the Court hastened to add that
the list was not exhaustive. Those factors include:
(i) presence [of the accused] at the time of the search; (ii) possession or control of
the property or place searched; (iii) ownership of the property or place; (iv) historical
use of the property or item; (v) the ability to regulate access, including the right to
admit or exclude others from the place; (vi) the existence of a subjective expectation
of privacy; and (vii) the objective reasonableness of the expectation.50

In passing, it may be worth commenting on the origins of this formula, which
Edwards attributed to United States v Gomez.51 Gomez was concerned with a
claimant’s standing to assert “a reasonable expectation of privacy in … [an] area
48. R v Edwards, [1996] 1 SCR 128, 132 DLR (4th) 31 [Edwards]; Plant, supra note 14.
49. R v Spencer, 2014 SCC 43, [2014] 2 SCR 212 [Spencer].
50. Edwards, supra note 48 at para 45. Spencer condenses these factors into four headings, which
might be regarded as an improvement, but carries the risk of presenting the analysis at a
level of abstraction that obscures the relevant considerations, and necessitates recourse to
Edwards (or another test) for more specific guidance about their meaning. See Spencer, supra
note 49 at para 18.
51. United States v Gomez, 16 F (3d) 254 (8th Cir 1994) [Gomez].
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searched”—that is to say, in a place—and said nothing about the presence of the
claimant.52 It is unclear how “presence” entered the Edwards test; however, it will
be evident that whenever there is a question as to privacy in mobile information
as such (rather than in the device holding that information), the factors involving
physical considerations have little significance.
In the case of an email, chat-room record, or text message retrieved from
a source that does not belong to the claimant, questions of physical custody,
ownership, and historical use of the text or record (or device holding that
information) can do no work in enhancing the claimant’s privacy interest and
will generally be irrelevant. In consequence, the questions of regulating access
and objectively reasonable expectations of privacy remain as the pertinent
considerations. “Presence” may be significant when the police are searching an
item or a place in which a claimant could assert ownership (such as a residence,
car, locker, or suitcase), and when the police are searching a physical space that
the claimant is occupying (e.g., a stall in a public washroom or in someone
else’s residence).53 When the police are extracting information from a phone,
computer, or similar device in the hands of a third party, the claimant is usually
absent, and the search would not be more invasive if the claimant were present.
In such a case, the third and fourth Edwards factors (ownership and historical
use of the property) must also be excluded: The device storing the information
is not the property of the accused, nor is the information itself (in the relevant
sense of “property”), and the historical use of the device and of the information
can have no bearing on the privacy of the claimant (assuming that the “historical
use” factor even applies here).
In the case of mobile information, the second Edwards factor (“control of
the property”) amounts to much the same thing as the sixth factor (“the ability
to regulate access”). Arguably, “control of the property” applies better to physical
property, for which ownership is readily associated with control, whereas “the
ability to regulate access” applies better to information, because its intangible
nature makes access the more salient question, but a resort to either would
ultimately emphasize that when the police obtain mobile information from
the recipient, the sender has usually sacrificed some control or regulation over
access. The question, then, is what difference that should make in the analysis,
and on this point, the courts have diverged significantly. Some courts—including
the Court of Appeal for Ontario, in the decision that Marakah reversed—have
reasoned that sending a message necessarily entails giving up control over
52. Ibid at 256.
53. On the last point, see Sklansky, supra note 28.
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it, and thereby losing any privacy interest, while others have repudiated that
conclusion.54 In Part III(C) below, I will show why the “loss of control” argument
establishes very little. Here, it is sufficient to observe that the control/access parts
of the test have done much of the work when courts have turned to Edwards to
resolve questions about mobile information. The only remaining consideration is
the inquiry into “objective reasonableness”—a vexed question that bedevils every
privacy case, and that has also produced a significant amount of disagreement
among the courts, including disagreement as to what grounds this question
should encompass. I take up this question below, in Part IV(A).
Turning from Edwards to Plant, we see that the latter is less apt to provide
categorical answers. In focusing on informational privacy, Plant poses a series
of questions that can sometimes, but not always, be answered before the police
conduct a search. Plant mentions five factors:
[1] the nature of the information itself, [2] the nature of the relationship between
the party releasing the information and the party claiming its confidentiality, [3] the
place where the information was obtained, [4] the manner in which it was obtained
and [5] the seriousness of the crime being investigated.55

The Court did not apply this test in Marakah, even though Plant is specifically
directed at questions of informational privacy, and Edwards is not. From
one perspective, that choice makes good sense, because the Plant test would
significantly complicate the analysis, as the following paragraphs show. On the
other hand, if Plant does not apply here, then its use in evaluating questions of
information privacy more generally would also seem to be open to question.
Numerous decisions relating to informational privacy have drawn on the Plant
test, and if the Court now regards it as inapposite, it would have been helpful to
say so directly.
Again, it bears repeating that when a search yields email, text messages, and
the like, the significance of a given factor may not be readily evident, because
the relevant details may not be available before or during the search. The “nature
of the information” bears on a claimant’s privacy most acutely when the search
yields “biographical core” information.56 What counts as personal and revealing
is sometimes a matter of interpretation. Consequently, a search that may
have appeared legitimate when it was underway could eventually prove to be
54. See note 7 and accompanying text above. The Marakah majority did not rebut this view, but
instead reasoned that the sender may sometimes have “shared control” with the recipient. See
Marakah, supra note 1.
55. Plant, supra note 14 at 293 [numbering added].
56. Ibid.
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impermissible, on grounds that offer the police no basis for deciding whether or
not to conduct a similar search in the future.
The second factor in Plant, the “nature of the [parties’] relationship,” matters
particularly when it is a confidential relationship, and again, the police may be
incapable of knowing this in advance—and may be unable to tell even after they
have acquired the information. Not all communications will necessarily indicate
the nature of the relationship between sender and recipient. Evidence on this
point may take some time to emerge. Thus, this factor too has limited predictive
value for determining the legitimacy of other, apparently similar, searches.
The question of “where the information was obtained” returns us to the spatial
considerations discussed in Part II, above . For example, when the information is
obtained, without legal authorization, from a claimant’s own residence or mobile
device, this feature alone will tend to jeopardize the results of the search. The
last two factors of the Plant test need not detain us for long. As to the “manner
of the search,” in the cases that concern us here, there is neither a warrant nor
a valid exception to the warrant requirement, but let us assume that there is
reasonable suspicion to believe that the suspects are co-conspirators, and that the
police conduct a limited search aimed only at disclosing information relating to
the conspiracy. Whether that reasonable suspicion can amount to legal authority
is precisely the question I will address in Part IV. As for the “seriousness of the
crime,” let us assume provisionally that the crime in question is very serious, and
we can modulate that assumption as needed when refining the analysis.
B. MOBILE INFORMATION AND BALANCING

At the outset, I offered a few short examples to show how contingent privacy
questions may receive different answers depending on the circumstances,57 but
it will help to provide some more illustrations, and particularly to show more
concretely how the answers may depend on considerations that are unavailable
to the police at the time of the search. In some of the cases involving electronic
communications and privacy, courts have resolved the issue categorically, and
have ruled that the claimant had a strong privacy interest because the emails and
other messages were collected en masse during a sweeping search of the claimant’s
computer. In these cases, courts have included email and various kinds of online
messages in the blend of materials that revealed “biographical core” information
about the claimant;58 however, this has not been taken to mean that email
inevitably attracts a strong privacy interest. When courts have been asked more
57. See text accompanying notes 36-40 above.
58. See e.g. R v Cole, 2012 SCC 53, [2012] 3 SCR 34.
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specifically about the privacy interest in a particular set of emails or messages,
acquired through a focused search, the answers have varied.
Thus, for example, in R v Lowrey, the accused was charged with “child
luring,” and the prosecution’s case included a series of Facebook messages between
the accused and a fourteen-year-old girl.59 The court offered various reasons for
allowing the messages into evidence; one reason was that “there is no proof that
the impugned messages expose highly revealing information about [the claimant].
At least on the evidence before me, one gains no glimpse into the biographical core
of information personal to Lowrey by reading the contents of [the messages].”60
As this explanation shows, the court undertook to scrutinize the messages,
and the analysis turned on details that the police could not have ascertained in
advance of the search. It was perhaps only by chance that the messages were not
so revealing as to make the court view the matter differently. Indeed, the British
Columbia Court of Appeal took the opposite view in R v Craig, another “child
luring” case involving internet messages, this time on Nexopia, “a social media
website used primarily by teenagers.”61 The court observed that the claimant’s
messages were “personal … [and] they exposed highly intimate details of [his]
lifestyle and personal choices. In his discussions … he is flirtatious, discloses
aspects of his sexuality, sexual history, drug use, and arranges to provide liquor
to underage persons.”62 The court therefore ruled that the claimant’s “expectation
of privacy in the messages seized by the police was objectively reasonable.”63 The
precise content of the messages, then, may play a significant role in determining
whether the search was permissible.

59.
60.
61.
62.
63.

R v Lowrey, 2016 ABPC 131, 357 CRR (2d) 76 [Lowrey].
Ibid at para 67.
R v Craig, 2016 BCCA 154 at para 3, 385 BCAC 229 [Craig].
Ibid at para 139.
Ibid at para 142. Ultimately, the court ruled that despite the privacy violation, the messages
were admissible under section 24(2) (ibid at para 197). For other examples of cases in which
evidence was excluded because various items, when examined individually, turned out to
reveal “biographical core” information, see e.g. R v Berry, 2013 BCSC 307 at para 60, 111
WCB (2d) 821 (“The camera may not have contained Mr. Berry’s biographical data as
such, but it contained video-recordings showing him in private situations or activities”);
R v Grandison, 2016 BCSC 1712 at para 93, 342 CCC (3d) 249 (“The content of text
messages may be perfunctory and routine or it might consist of very sensitive personal
information. … [In this case,] [t]he content of the information gathered … reveals ‘core
biographical information’ about the accused”). Compare R v O(T), 2010 ONCJ 334,
90 WCB (2d) 17: “[T]he seized videos and photographs were of a highly personal nature,
revealing details of the Applicant’s lifestyle” (ibid at para 34), but on balance, analysis under s
24(2) counseled in favour of admitting the evidence (ibid at para 64).

418

(2018) 55 OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL

The Lowrey court also considered another factor involving information that
is typically unavailable to the police at the time of the search:
Lowrey does not appear to have taken many practical steps to ensure that no one
could view the contents of his Facebook account and, in particular, the content of
text messages. He would leave his Facebook account “open” and accessible on his
unlocked cell phone, wherever that happened to be from time-to-time.64

A court might be satisfied that so long as the claimant had left the account open,
and the phone unlocked, at the moment when the police were conducting the
search, that would be sufficient to answer this question; however, it can hardly
be coincidental that Lowrey dwelt on the claimant’s usual practice, apparently
over an extended period of time, rather than simply considering the details that
the police could observe at the time of the search. Often, the police will have no
access to that kind of information until the court does—which is to say, long
after the impugned search. Consequently, if the claimant’s typical behaviour is
a significant factor in assessing the privacy interest, the question can rarely be
answered until the case comes to a hearing.
The court took a similar view in R v Beairsto, ruling that the claimant’s text
messages were admissible because, among other factors, he had done nothing
to ensure that his confederates would guarantee the privacy of his text messages
after their receipt. One of the claimant’s associates was arrested, and his phone,
seized during the arrest, was “open to a … chat” that was “indicative of drug
trafficking.”65 This led the police to Beairsto, who was ultimately convicted of
trafficking in cocaine. This conviction was possible, in part, because he lacked a
privacy interest in the text messages, but the important point here is that the police
had no means of telling, in advance, whether he had tried to protect the privacy
of his messages, and indeed the police often have no basis for answering that
question at the investigative stage. To premise the admissibility of the evidence on
that inquiry, then, is effectively to prevent the police from determining whether
the search is legally permissible. In Beairsto, the court focused in particular on
what the claimant knew about the security practices of his associates (very little,
as it turned out). Doubtless, the court noted, “a drug dealer would … hope that
his text messages concerning drug dealings would be kept in confidence by the
recipient,” but there was no evidence that Beairsto had ever met either of the
recipients in person, or had “had any knowledge of [their] habits, associates or
environment.” He had no basis for thinking that the recipients would protect
64. Lowrey, supra note 59 at para 69.
65. R v Beairsto, 2016 ABQB 216 at para 11, 37 Alta LR (6th) 379.
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“the confidentiality and security of [his] text communications,” or that they
would keep “others [from] hav[ing] access to his messages.”66 He lacked “any
assurances of privacy or confidentiality,” but he “[n]evertheless … chose to use a
… means of communicating” that was not “secure.”67 Different answers to these
questions—involving details that could only come out while the case was being
litigated—might have led the court to find a privacy interest, and to rule that the
search was impermissible.
One might think that none of these considerations has any continuing
significance for the treatment of text messages, because Marakah did not take them
into account, and thus it implicitly overrules any analysis that draws on them.
However, as we have seen, the Court’s reasoning relies more heavily on contingent
factors than may at first appear, making it hard to predict whether lower courts
will simply ignore Plant in future cases involving electronic communications.
Moreover, where a privacy interest turns on the general tendency of a certain
medium to reveal “biographical core” information, courts may be persuaded that
if the evidence in contention did not actually reveal such information, the privacy
interest was impaired only minimally, and hence, in spite of the Charter breach,
the evidence is admissible under section 24(2) of the Charter. That is how the
court proceeded, for instance, in R v Jarvis.68 The accused, a high school teacher,
was charged with criminal voyeurism because he had used a pen camera to make
surreptitious video images of female students during gym class. The Ontario
Superior Court of Justice ruled that he had a privacy interest in the pen camera
because the kind of information such a device contains “may relate to aspects
of life that are deeply personal.”69 In the event at issue, however, it turned out

66. Ibid at para 46.
67. Ibid.
68. 2014 ONSC 1801, 113 WCB (2d) 740 [Jarvis (2014)]. The accused was acquitted at trial
(see R v Jarvis, 2015 ONSC 6813, 25 CR (7th) 330) and the acquittal was affirmed on
appeal by a split bench (see R v Jarvis, 2017 ONCA 778, 41 CR (7th) 36). The case is now
on appeal as of right to the Supreme Court of Canada (Docket No 37833, notice of appeal
filed 8 November 2017). The issues in dispute, however, relate to the substantive grounds for
determining whether the accused was guilty of voyeurism, as defined in the Criminal Code,
not the admissibility of the video recordings.
69. Jarvis (2014), supra note 68 at para 57 quoting Buhay, supra note 20 at para 24.
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that his device “did not contain any personal biographical data.”70 Consequently
the police had not seriously infringed on his privacy rights, and the recordings
were admissible in court. So long as generally private types of information may
be admissible just if the particular examples turn out to rate low on the Plant or
Edwards test, all of the potentially relevant factors from those decisions come
back into play—as a means of ruling on the strength, rather than the existence of
a privacy interest, and therefore on the admissibility of the evidence. Practically
speaking, it makes little difference at which stage of the analysis these factors
come into play, because so long as they operate in this fashion, the basic question
about how they bear on the legitimacy of a given search, from an ex ante point of
view, remains the same.
As we have seen, the first two factors of the Plant test can make it difficult
for police to tell whether they may legitimately undertake a particular search.
If we reflect more generally on the results in Lowrey and Beairsto, however, they
can suggest an approach that would help the police to decide whether or not
to proceed. In most cases involving conspiracies to sell drugs, firearms, and
similar contraband, there is good reason to doubt that the communications
among the conspirators would include “biographical core” information. Again,
even if the conspirators took some pains to assure each other that they would
protect the confidentiality of their communications, that can hardly be a reason
for the courts to ascribe a heightened privacy interest to the messages. If the
police can show objectively that they have reasonable suspicion to believe that
the claimants were conspiring in this fashion, they should be allowed to presume
that the claimants had only a basic privacy interest in their communications, and
on that basis, the police should be entitled to obtain the relevant text messages
(and only those messages). Where that reasonable suspicion is well supported,
70. Jarvis (2014), supra note 68 at para 93. For similar examples, see e.g. R v Moldovan, 85 WCB
(2d) 203, [2009] OJ No 4442 (QL) at paras 177-78 (Sup Ct) (impact of Charter breach
was minimal, even though police lacked authorization to intercept phone conversation,
because “the state did not intercept anything of a personal nature … On the contrary,
as it happens, the police intercepted only conversations in which the very criminality they
were investigating was being discussed” at para 177); R v Robertson, 2017 BCSC 965 at
paras 78-79, [2017] BCWLD 3946 (impact of Charter breach was “minor,” even though
police “fail[ed] to properly execute the entry pursuant to the knock and announce rule,”
because, among other reasons, it turned out that the items seized were “not particularly
personal or private”); R v Clarke, 2016 ONSC 351 at paras 135-36, 129 WCB (2d) 377
(impact of Charter breach was “not … on the more serious end of the spectrum,” even
though bank records were acquired pursuant to deficient production order, because although
“[b]ank records contain personal financial information,” the material seized did not reveal
information about “the most private domains” of the accused’s life).
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any invasion of a privacy interest is minimal, as in Jarvis. Moreover, given that
Plant refers to the seriousness of the crime as well as the other considerations
discussed here, the gravity of an offence such as conspiring to sell firearms might
even be sufficient to overcome some factors that would enhance the privacy of
one’s communications. In that case, even when the conspirators have disclosed
biographically significant details or are siblings in a “crime family” jointly engaged
in a conspiracy, these considerations may be insufficient to render the fruits of the
search inadmissible. By ruling on this point, a court could further enhance the
predictability of the analysis, educating the police and public more clearly as to
how these considerations will bear on the legitimacy of a search.
C. THE ARGUMENT FROM CONTROL

We have seen that when courts refer to Plant, the analysis tends to be individuated,
and the predictive value of any given decision is limited. However, some courts
have given little heed to Plant, drawing primarily on Edwards and therefore
reaching categorical conclusions. The Court sought to take this approach in
Marakah, with limited success. With respect to text messages, a significant part
of the debate has turned on the fifth Edwards factor—“the ability to regulate
access.” This consideration played a significant role in the lower court judgment
that Marakah reversed, and also in the reasons of the dissenting opinion of the
Court in Marakah. That logic also informs the dissent in R v Pelucco, a judgment
by the British Columbia Court of Appeal addressing the same problem.71 The
analyses in all three decisions are worth considering, because the majority in
Marakah did not rebut this argument, leaving the impression that it still has
some persuasive force if the prosecution can demonstrate that the accused lost
control over the text messages. As I will show, this argument cannot withstand
close scrutiny.
The Marakah dissent offers what is perhaps a more elliptical version of
the “loss of control” argument than some other courts have furnished. Justice
Moldaver, in his dissent, explains that “a reasonable expectation of personal
privacy requires some measure of control over the subject matter of the search,”72
and that “[c]ontrol distinguishes a personal desire for privacy from a reasonable
expectation of privacy.”73 Citing Duarte’s definition of privacy as “the right of
… individual[s] to determine for [themselves] when, how, and to what extent
[they] will release personal information,” Justice Moldaver reasons that once a
71. Pelucco, supra note 11.
72. Marakah, supra note 1 at para 113 (Moldaver J, dissenting).
73. Ibid at para 119 [emphasis in original].
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person loses control over some piece of information, it “change[s] from private
to public in nature.”74 The recipient, he observes, has “complete autonomy” over
the information,75 except when, by statute or at common law, the recipient has
“a qualified obligation … to maintain confidentiality over personal information
[which] provides a measure of constructive control which can support a reasonable
expectation of privacy.”76 On this view, the inability to regulate access and the
condition of being public are so closely linked that little more need be said about
why the former entails the latter. The analysis turns only briefly to the results
that follow from lack of control: “The risk that a recipient may repeat what was
said during a conversation, or share his or her record of the conversation with
others, is a risk that individuals must reasonably assume, and thus may defeat a
reasonable expectation of privacy.”77 On this view, whatever cannot be controlled
is subject to a risk of being shared, and the very possibility of that risk is the
feature that changes the nature of the information.
Marakah reversed a judgment by a split bench of the Court of Appeal for
Ontario, and in examining the relation between privacy and control, the majority
on that court relied heavily on the Pelucco dissent. Indeed, in elaborating its
reasoning, the court quoted approvingly, and at length, from the Pelucco dissent:
[W]here a … message reaches its intended recipient, the autonomy interest
underlying our s. 8 understanding of privacy is fully realized (see e.g., Hunter v.
Southam at 159, R. v. Plant, [1993] 3 S.C.R. 281 at 293, and Tessling at para. 63).
A person who—without any guarantee of confidentiality or indication from the
recipient that the message will be kept confidential—communicates information
has made an autonomous choice (i.e., determined for himself or herself ) [to]
who[m], how and to what extent to communicate information to the fullest extent
possible. Any further claim against a recipient is a claim that the sender can then
determine [to] who[m], how and to what extent the recipient will communicate
information to further third parties, which interferes with the recipient’s notional
sphere of personal autonomy.78

74. Ibid at para 125 citing R v Duarte, [1990] 1 SCR 30 at 46, 65 DLR (4th) 240 [Duarte].
75. Marakah, supra note 1 at paras 99, 145.
76. Ibid at para 141. This includes, but is not limited to, a relationship with “a lawyer,
doctor, psychiatrist or another professional who owes a duty of confidentiality or trust
to the claimant,” or a regulated entity that is subject to statutory privacy protection
(ibid at para 137).
77. Ibid at para 129.
78. Marakah, ONCA, supra note 3 at para 78 quoting Pelucco, supra note 11 at paras 115, 118
(Goepel JA dissenting).
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It is usually wise, when encountering block quotations of this length, to skip
over them and proceed to the text, but I urge the reader to review the quoted
language, because it furnishes the fullest justification yet offered in Canadian
jurisprudence as a principled rationale for the termination of the sender’s privacy
interest on receipt of the message, and as will become evident, the justification
rapidly crumbles upon scrutiny.
First, the “loss of control” argument control proves too much. If the inability
to control the recipient was sufficient by itself to terminate the sender’s privacy
interest, it would follow that no one has a reasonable expectation of privacy
in a letter or an email, once it has been delivered, and hence that all forms of
written correspondence, as a general matter, are freely available to the police on a
warrantless basis—because where there is no privacy interest, the police have no
need to articulate any justification for search or seizure. Analogously, if someone
had a phone that automatically recorded each incoming call, the recording would
also be freely available to the police, and could be used in evidence against the
caller, even if the police acquired it without any justification. This view finds no
support in Canadian jurisprudence. When courts have considered the privacy
interest attaching to letters, the question has usually involved correspondence
sent by prison inmates, whose privacy interests are diminished to such a point
that their letters may be intercepted in transit.79
The Pelucco dissent cited US jurisprudence to indicate that US courts have
indeed taken this view, speaking of the “American rationale that a letter’s author
does not have a reasonable expectation of privacy [after it has been delivered].”80
But US courts do not routinely admit letters obtained during police searches that
were conducted without either a warrant or a recognized exception to the warrant
requirement. Although a number of US courts have asserted this view, in nearly
every instance the police acquired the letter either by means of a lawful search
or from a third party who voluntarily turned the letter over to law enforcement
79. See e.g. R v Ballantyne, 2008 BCSC 1566 at paras 32, 88, [2009] BCWLD 5161 (“Various
cases deal with the effect that prisoners in correctional institutions, whether they be on
remand or serving a sentence, have a greatly reduced objective expectation of privacy,”
holding that “Mr. Ballantyne had no reasonable expectation of privacy in the correspondence
he mailed from the Winnipeg Remand Centre” at paras 32, 88); R v Stevens, 2001 ABQB
340 at paras 35-36, 291 AR 40: “[T]he [two] accused … knew that their letters were being
screened or knew there was a substantial and serious risk that the letters were being screened”
(ibid at para 35). As such, “there existed no reasonable expectation of privacy with respect to
the correspondence between [the two accused]” (ibid at para 36).
80. Pelucco, supra note 11 at para 112 (Goepel JA dissenting) citing Ray v United States, 658
F (2d) 608 at 610 (8th Cir 1981) [Ray], United States v Hubbard, 493 F Supp 209 (DDC
1979) [Hubbard]. See also supra note 81.
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officials.81 These settings do not involve an unauthorized search. Once we set
those cases aside, not even a handful of cases remain—and their facts are so
ambiguous that they offer only weak support for the conclusion being urged.82
The “loss of control” argument, according to the very terms in which the Marakah
and Pelucco dissents explain it, would eliminate the privacy interest in most forms
of written communication. The existing Canadian and US jurisprudence does
not warrant such an extreme view.
Second, the Pelucco dissent strives unpersuasively to explain its position
by appealing to the sender’s “autonomy interest,” which is asserted to be “fully
realized” on the letter’s receipt, such that any further constraint would “interfer[e]
81. In those instances, the third parties were individuals, not entities such as banks or internet
service providers. For example, in United States v King, 55 F (3d) 1193 (6th Cir 1995), the
letters came to light because the recipient “asked [the FBI agent investing the case] to remove
some items from her apartment” (ibid at 1195), and these included “[a] suitcase containing
fifty-one letters” from the defendant to the recipient (ibid at 1194).
82. According to the leading American treatise on the law of search and seizure by Wayne R
LaFave, “[t]he standing of the sender … terminates once delivery of the goods has been
made.” LaFave cites nine cases to support this view, many of which expressly assert this very
proposition; however, in eight of the nine cases, a third party turned the letter over to the
police, or the letter was the subject of a valid search warrant, or was in plain view during
a validly executed search, or was obtained during a search pursuant to arrest. Wayne R
LaFave, Search and Seizure: A Treatise on the Fourth Amendment, 5th ed, §11.3(f ) (2016).
In the ninth case, State v Kenny, 224 Neb 638 (1987) [Kenny], the Nebraska Supreme Court
upheld a conviction that depended, in part, on the prosecution’s use of a letter written by
the defendant and obtained through a search that was not supported by probable cause
or any exception to the probable cause requirement (although the facts suggest that the
search may have been supported by reasonable suspicion). Even assuming that there was no
articulable basis at all for the search in Kenny, this forty-year old decision by a state court can
hardly be considered sufficient, by itself, to establish the point in question. One may suspect
that the leading treatise in this area would have included more cases not only asserting the
proposition, but also applying it, if they were available to be found. The two US authorities
cited in the Pelucco dissent (see Pelucco, supra note 11 at para 112 citing Hubbard, supra note
80, and Ray, supra note 80) also offer little support. In Hubbard, the court observed that
the letters in question had been made “available to numerous third parties” (Hubbard, supra
note 80 at 214). Where the recipient has actually shared the information with “numerous”
others, one need not speculate about how the privacy interest could terminate; by her
own actions, the recipient has in fact terminated it by making the information public.
Ray offers no independent analysis of the privacy issue, and instead depends entirely on
Hubbard. Moreover, Ray frames the inquiry in terms of standing, rather than inquiring
into the defendant’s privacy interest in the letters that the search disclosed: the court was
content simply to observe that the defendant “lacks standing to contest the alleged search
of [a third party’s] hotel room” (Ray, supra note 80 at 611). In neither case, then, did the
mere supposition of what the recipient might do explain why the sender had no privacy
interest in a letter.
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with the recipient’s notional sphere of personal autonomy.”83 This argument
appears fleetingly in the Marakah dissent, when Justice Moldaver refers to the
recipient’s “autonomy,” which, by implication, comes to the fore just when
the sender’s autonomy terminates.84 For this proposition, Pelucco cites Hunter,
Plant, and Tessling,85 but those cases provide no help; in fact, they undermine
the contention. Hunter, in the relevant passage, does not use the term autonomy,
but does speak of the “right of privacy, which is the right to be secure against
encroachment against the citizens’ reasonable expectation of privacy in a free and
democratic society.”86 The relevant passage in Plant speaks of “the underlying
values of dignity, integrity, and autonomy”—values which the Charter recognizes
by “protect[ing] a biographical core of personal information which individuals
in a free and democratic society would wish to maintain and control from
dissemination by the state.”87 Tessling, in the cited paragraph, states that a heat
pattern emanating from a residence “offers no insight into [the residents’] private
life, and reveals nothing of [their] ‘biographical core of personal information.’
Its disclosure scarcely affects the ‘dignity, integrity and autonomy’ of the person
whose house is subject of the FLIR image.”88
As these quotations show, the case law speaks not of autonomy alone, but
of dignity and integrity as well. Moreover, the proposition about the expiry of
the autonomy interest is simply Pelucco’s interpretation, unsupported by any
language in the three cited cases. The dissents in Pelucco and Marakah gloss over
the question of whether one’s interests in dignity and integrity also expire on
receipt of the message, and it cannot go without saying that these interests would
vanish so readily; if anything, the latter are more enduring than autonomy in
these circumstances. Even if we focus solely on autonomy, however, it is hard to
see how that interest can be said to “disappear” once a message has been delivered.
Again, it must be emphasized that we are discussing the right of individuals “to be
secure against encroachment … in a free and democratic society,” and the right
of individuals, in such a society, to protect information “from dissemination by
the state.” The question of whether the recipient may share a message, in such a
society, should not be readily and casually conflated with the question of how
83. Marakah, ONCA, supra note 3 at para 78 quoting Pelucco, supra note 11 at para 118 (Goepel
JA dissenting). One may wish to stress the word notional, because it reveals one of the
weakest aspects of this analysis.
84. See supra note 74.
85. See note 78 and the accompanying text above.
86. Hunter, supra note 14 at 159.
87. Plant, supra note 14 at 293.
88. Tessling, supra note 21 at para 63.
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that potential result bears on what the state may legitimately do, particularly if
the recipient has not in fact done anything, but suffers only a “notional” harm to
a theoretically postulated “sphere of personal autonomy” in a thought experiment
about the use of the message.
Consider a society in which text messages (to say nothing of emails and
letters) are open to police surveillance, which is achieved by collecting them from
the recipient, so that any given text message is subject to “dissemination by the
state,” as Plant put it. Can anyone doubt that this practice would significantly
undermine people’s autonomy, and that people would hesitate before sending
any message, because of their uncertainty about its ultimate destination and
use? The most basic conception of “privacy in a free and democratic society”
has to assume that communications are not presumptively available to the
police without any articulable justification, yet this is what the “loss of control”
argument seeks to prove.
As noted at the outset, when a reasonable expectation of privacy is lacking,
the police may search on a warrantless and groundless basis. The sender’s lack
of control may be a relevant consideration in evaluating the privacy interest
in written communications, but to make it determinative would undermine
precisely the values that Hunter, Plant, and Tessling (among other decisions) seek
to advance by limiting the government’s powers of search and seizure. One need
only consider the question briefly to see that all of the interests at stake in the
privacy jurisprudence, including autonomy, would be significantly compromised
under the “loss of control” theory.
D. THE CONTROL THEORY AND THE THIRD-PARTY DOCTRINE

How did the confusion at the heart of the “loss of control” theory arise? Reduced
to its basic form, the theory assumes that because the recipient may share a
message with anyone else, the sender’s autonomy interest necessarily expires where
the recipient’s interest begins, and so the police are entitled to have access to the
message without having to specify any articulable grounds. Yet one of the most
fundamental principles of the law of search and seizure—and of constitutional
law generally—is that restrictions on state power do not apply to private
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individuals.89 Individuals may engage in all kinds of conduct that is forbidden
to the state. It seems odd, then, to conclude that an individual’s ability to
disseminate someone else’s message (or email, or letter) automatically entitles the
state to do the same thing. The conclusion does not seem so odd, however, once
we realize that, in the law of search and seizure, the “public exposure” doctrine
and its cognates have blurred part of the distinction between individual and
state action. Items exposed to public view (e.g., atop a dashboard, visible in an
unzipped backpack on the subway, posted on a freely available electronic bulletin
board) are treated as open to the public and therefore open to police inspection.90
Precisely because any random member of the public might happen to see it,
the police may also view it without having to articulate any basis for looking at
it—without reasonable and probable grounds or reasonable suspicion. It matters
not whether anyone except the police officer has seen it, so long as it is publicly
observable. By extension, the same logic applies to records of public transactions.
For instance, if the owner of a convenience store videotapes activities within
the store or passers-by on the sidewalk, the police are not required to articulate
any grounds for obtaining the video to use it in an investigation, because what
it records is public activity: Any random member of the public may observe
it, and so the actor has no privacy right in the publicly observable part of the
transaction.91 Criminal investigations often proceed by collecting information
that is available to be seen by others, and hence is “public” in this sense.
Up to this point, the connection between what a person does in public and
what the police may acquire, on a warrantless and groundless basis, may seem
perfectly sensible. In what is known as the “third-party doctrine,” this idea has
been taken one step further, and treats many transactions as public even though
89. See Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, s 32(1), Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982
being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982, c 11. Section 32(1) of the Charter
states that it applies:
(a) to the Parliament and government of Canada in respect of all matters within the authority of
Parliament including all matters relating to the Yukon Territory and Northwest Territories; and
(b) to the legislature and government of each province in respect of all matters within the
authority of the legislature of each province.

See also McKinney v University of Guelph, [1990] 3 SCR 229 at 262, 76 DLR (4th) 545;
R v Dell, 2005 ABCA 246 at para 6, 256 DLR (4th) 271 (“the Charter only applies to
government actions, not interactions between private citizens”) citing Schreiber v Canada
(Attorney General), [1998] 1 SCR 841 at para 27, 158 DLR (4th) 577.
90. See supra notes 29, 40.
91. See note 29 and the accompanying text above.
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they are not observable in the same way as in the examples above. In the version
adopted by the US courts, information available to any third party, even one
acting in a quasi-fiduciary capacity (e.g., a bank or phone company), is deemed
“public” and so is freely available to the police according to the same logic.92 But
although a deposit includes details shared with bank personnel, it can hardly
sustain the same analogy to “public exposure” as a transaction in a convenience
store. The mistake, then, is to conclude that whatever an individual shares with
anyone else should be treated as public. Notably, no one has offered a normative
argument in favour of the third-party doctrine; on the contrary the normative
arguments all cut the other way.93
The confusion underlying the “loss of control” theory is a product of this
tacit and misguided logic. Just because many transactions visible to third parties
are public, it does not follow that all such transactions are public. Although it
is permissible for the recipient of a text message to forward it to others, the
mere possibility of that eventuality does not render the message “public” in the
same way that a purchase at a convenience store is public. When activity or
information is not exposed to the public, we should recall the constitutional
difference between restrictions on state action and on the action of private
individuals, instead of blithely assuming that whatever some individual might do,
the state may immediately proceed to do, even when the individual has actually
done nothing. When the recipient of a message in fact makes it public, even
without the sender’s permission (e.g., by posting a text message online), the logic
of the “public exposure” doctrine applies; it hardly makes sense to ask the police
to avert their gaze from a message that everyone else can observe.94 The sender
may well perceive it as a betrayal of confidence, just as a police informer may
92. Kiel Brennan-Marquez, “Fourth Amendment Fiduciaries” (2015) 84:2 Fordham L Rev 611.
93. See e.g. Susan Freiwald, “First Principles of Communications Privacy” (2007) [2007] Stan
Tech L Rev 3; Stephen E Henderson, “Beyond the (Current) Fourth Amendment: Protecting
Third-Party Information, Third Parties, and the Rest of Us Too” (2007) 34:4 Pepp L Rev
975; Susan W Brenner & Leo L Clarke, “Fourth Amendment Protection for Shared Privacy
Rights in Stored Transactional Data” (2006) 14:1 JL & Pol’y 211; Gerald G Ashdown,
“The Fourth Amendment and the ‘Legitimate Expectation of Privacy’” (1981) 34:5 Vand L
Rev 1289 at 1315; Lewis R Katz, “In Search of a Fourth Amendment for the Twenty-first
Century” (1990) 65:3 Ind LJ 549 at 564–66. One of the few efforts to defend the third-party
doctrine on any ground is Orin S Kerr, “The Case for the Third-Party Doctrine” (2008)
107:4 Mich L Rev 561. However, Kerr offers a descriptive account, not a normative one, and
the factors that go into his description are themselves difficult to pin down. See Simon Stern,
“The Third Party Doctrine and the Third Person” (2011) 16:3 New Crim L Rev 364.
94. See Hubbard, supra note 80. This is precisely why Hubbard does not support the “loss of
control” that the Pelucco dissent attributed to it.
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betray the confidence of her former associates—but in both cases, this personal
betrayal does not translate into a constitutional privacy violation. However,
when no such action has occurred, and the courts are left instead to hypothesize
that the recipient might yet post the message, and that consequently it is already
exposed to the public. The result is to expand the meaning of “public” beyond
any plausible bounds.
The “loss of control” theory, then, yields a qualified version of the third-party
doctrine—a doctrine which the Supreme Court of Canada has rejected.95
More precisely, in R v Duarte the Court rejected a specific version of the
third-party doctrine, which holds that by sharing information with someone
else, an individual takes the risk that the other person “will make a permanent
electronic record … at the behest of the state.”96 The “loss of control” theory
proceeds along similar but not identical lines, reasoning that when information is
conveyed to another, and the sender has no legal grounds (deriving from a statute
or a recognized relationship of confidentiality) for controlling the recipient, the
information automatically loses its privacy protection, precisely because of the
sender’s lack of control. The US version of the doctrine cuts even more widely
because it pays less heed to the legal conditions restricting the recipient’s actions,
and treats customers’ interactions with banks and credit card issuers as similarly
open to police search on a warrantless basis.97
The slightly less draconian implications of the qualified version may therefore
seem more acceptable, but it remains inconsistent with Canadian jurisprudence,
and it becomes even more obviously untenable when its dimensions are fully
delineated. It is also worth noting that despite their similar effect, the grounds of
the third-party doctrine and the “loss of control theory” are somewhat different:
The US version reflects the idea that what has been revealed to another is thereby
rendered public—and therefore should be analogized to “public exposure” once
it has been shared. The version set out in the Marakah dissent assumes that
control is a sine qua non for privacy—and consequently that when information
can be shared and controlled (e.g., when it is shared with a regulated entity that
has certain obligations of confidentiality), it attracts a privacy interest that the US
95. See e.g. R v Ward, 2012 ONCA 660 at para 76, 112 OR (3d) 321 (“Canadian jurisprudence
has emphatically rejected the ‘risk’ analysis featured in American Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence … According to that jurisprudence, voluntary disclosure to third parties
defeats Fourth Amendment claims”) citing Duarte, supra note 74 at 48 and R v Wong (1987),
1 WCB (2d) 415 at para 45, 19 OAC 365 as examples of such Canadian jurisprudence.
96. Duarte, supra note 74 at 42.
97. See e.g. United States v Miller, 425 US 435 at 440-44, 446 (1976) (banks); United States v
Phibbs, 999 F (2d) 1053 at 1077-78 (6th Cir 1993) (credit cards).
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version of the doctrine would not support.98 Although neither doctrine has found
much normative justification, this difference means that the normative critiques
of the US doctrine do not map readily onto the Canadian version, as I seek to
show in the next Part.

IV. THE PRIVACY INTEREST
If the “loss of control” theory proves unavailing as a ground for vitiating any
privacy interest in text messages, what kind of privacy protection should they
enjoy? On this question, the Marakah majority offers a persuasive answer, but
offers no normative justification. If we return to the values whose importance has
been reiterated throughout the privacy jurisprudence—autonomy, dignity, and
integrity—it is evident that written communications, as a general matter, engage
all three interests, even when they are not somehow marked out as especially
private, or sent to fiduciaries or quasi-fiduciaries. In this Part, I attempt to provide
that normative justification, and show why reasonable suspicion is enough to
overcome the privacy interest, when the police can offer objective grounds for
suspecting that particular individuals are involved in a criminal conspiracy.
E.

THE OBJECTIVE REQUIREMENT

In spite of the many factors animating the various tests on offer, analyses of privacy
often turn in the end on the question of whether a claimant’s expectation of
privacy was “objectively reasonable.” As the courts have explained, an “objectively
reasonable expectation of privacy” is one that “society is prepared to recognize as
reasonable,”99 and it refers to “a normative rather than a descriptive standard.”100
This is not the place for an extended discussion of the difference between the
normative and the descriptive, but it is worth noting, in passing, that for this kind
of inquiry, empirical evidence is useful only insofar as it bears on norms, or allows
us to infer norms from practices. To content oneself with a list of practices and the
beliefs underlying them, as courts often do, reveals nothing about norms because
people often regard certain practices or attitudes as commonplace, while also
viewing them as normatively objectionable. Therefore, empirical evidence, drawn
from practices, may not be very helpful in showing what society is prepared to
recognize as reasonable.
98. See supra note 76. Under the US third-party doctrine, the information shared with these
entities is not entitled to constitutional privacy protection.
99. R v M(A), supra note 13 at para 33.
100. Tessling, supra note 21 at para 42.
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If we pursue the analogies to letters and conversations, proposed earlier,
it is evident that the same normative logic governs all of these forms of
communication. A conversation on a park bench or on a public street, no matter
how private the topic, merits little protection if it is loud enough to be overheard
by a police officer strolling by; society would not be prepared to recognize the
interlocutors’ expectation of privacy as reasonable. The same is true for a text
message that the recipient displays in public (even though the sender forbade it).
To be sure, electronic forms of communication are likelier than paper-and-ink
correspondence to be widely distributed, or to become publicly visible. But
when neither the sender nor the recipient has actually done anything to make
a text message available to others, society is prepared to recognize the sender’s
expectation of privacy as reasonable.
No detailed empirical research or philosophical theory is required to see this
because the analogy to other forms of written communication readily shows why
the expectation is objectively reasonable. One need only turn to the history of
the Fourth Amendment in the United States to see why a belief in the privacy of
written communications is objectively reasonable, as a general matter. As every
historian of criminal procedure knows, the provisions of the Fourth Amendment
(and thus, ultimately, of section 8 of the Charter in turn) were prompted in
large part by hostility towards the British use of “general warrants”—open
search warrants, naming no individual in particular, that allowed government
“messengers” to search the homes and offices of anyone they chose, and to seize
whatever they found. More specifically, the Fourth Amendment was a response
to the use of general warrants during the investigation of John Wilkes and his
associates for their involvement in The North Briton in 1763.101 General warrants
were objectionable because of the indiscriminate searches that they licensed, and
letters were among the many documents that government agents collected, during
these searches. In the course of the Wilkes investigation, one of the messengers
ransacked the home of the bookseller George Kearsley, “prob[ing] every bureau
and drawer in his house, [and] confiscat[ing] his account books, letters, and
notes at will,”102 seeking correspondence from Wilkes. In one of the lawsuits
that followed, it was alleged that the messengers had “examined all the private
papers, books, letters and correspondence of the plaintiff and his clients.”103
101. See e.g. Laura K Donohue, “The Original Fourth Amendment” (2016) 83:3 U
Chicago L Rev 1181.
102. William John Cuddihy, The Fourth Amendment: Origins and Original Meaning, 1602-1791
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009) at 441.
103. Beardmore v Carrington (1764), 2 Wils KB 244, 95 ER 790.

432

(2018) 55 OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL

Anger about these large-scale searches led to the adoption of a constitutional
prohibition on unreasonable searches that violate “[t]he right of the people to
be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects.”104 The generality of the
general warrants was the most important reason for adopting this measure, and
by referring specifically to “papers” and “effects,” this language makes it clear that
its protections extend to letters.
One consequence of a theory that treats text messages and letters in the same
fashion would be to eliminate some of the contingency we have seen in the analysis
in Marakah. Recall that according to the majority in Marakah, text messages
attract a privacy interest just when they are composed in a fashion that creates a
“zone of privacy”—that is, when they are shielded from others’ eyes.105 In the case
of a letter, anyone who happened to observe the process of its composition would
be free to tell others about it, including the police—but it would not follow that if
the police conducted a warrantless and groundless search that happened to yield
that letter, they would be free to use it in court. Marakah’s treatment of the “zone
of privacy,” however, seems to yield precisely that result for text messages. Again,
the author of a letter often has no control at all over what the recipient does with
it—and yet the sender’s inability to regulate access to the information has little
bearing on the privacy interest that attaches to it. By contrast, Marakah secures
protection for text messages only when there is “shared control,” leaving open the
implication that text messages do not necessarily enjoy Charter protection when
such control is shown to be absent. In short, a theory that looks to the social
interests in protecting written correspondence, as a general matter, would result
in a more categorical form of protection for text messages, eliminating some of
the contingency that the reasoning in Marakah allows.
But even if the person who sends a text message has a reasonable expectation
of privacy, it does not follow that the police can have access to the text message
only when they are executing a warrant that expressly places it within the ambit
of the search. Generally, when the police receive evidence from someone who
has lawful possession or custody of it, and who is not under any statutory
obligation to withhold it, section 8 of the Charter does not apply, because there
has been no “search” within the meaning of section 8. As the Court explained in
R v Law, “[t]he principal purpose of s. 8 of the Charter is to protect an accused’s
privacy interests against unreasonable intrusion by the State.”106 Similarly,
in R v Gomboc, the Court contrasted “the voluntary cooperation of a private
104. US Const amend IV.
105. Marakah, supra note 1 at para 37.
106. R v Law, 2002 SCC 10 at para 15, [2002] 1 SCR 227 [emphasis added].
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actor with the police” against a request, by police, that an electric utility install
a device to record a consumer’s power usage.107 The latter, the Court explained,
“constitute[d] a search that infringes s. 8 of the Charter.”108 The thrust of these
statements is to show that a “search” is precisely analogous to a “seizure,” within
the meaning of section 8. In R v Colarusso, the Court defined a seizure as “the
taking of something from a person by a public authority without that person’s
consent.”109 It is the act of a public authority that makes the appropriation a
seizure. Consequently, as various courts have held, when someone “obtain[s] …
personal information … as a private citizen” and “provide[s] the information …
of her own volition” to a state actor, there has been no seizure.110 Analogously,
when a private individual voluntarily provides a letter or a text message to the
police, there has been no search. In that case, the state has not intruded on the
claimant’s privacy interests, and therefore even a heightened privacy interest in
the communication will not help to justify its exclusion.
This much may seem obvious in the context of letters and emails that a
recipient voluntarily gives to the police; however, courts have sometimes devoted
a significant amount of unnecessary space to the analysis of privacy interests in
such cases. In Lowrey (one of the “child luring” cases), the child’s mother contacted
the police to report the incident, and the mother and daughter then met with
police, to whom they “provided … a printed copy of the ‘messages’ exchanged”
in the course of the online conversations between the child and the claimant.111
Similarly, in Craig (another “child luring” case), the recipients furnished the
police with the messages exchanged. As the court noted, “[t]he messages [used
in evidence] were all from the [social media] accounts of … the witnesses,”112
namely, the child whom the claimant had been messaging and her two friends,
who “printed off” the messages themselves and gave them to the police.113 Again,
in R v Sandhu, the complainant showed the police threatening text messages
he had received from the accused, and the trial court inquired into the sender’s
expectation of privacy.114 This approach is misguided. The objective reasonableness
107. R v Gomboc, 2010 SCC 55 at para 104, [2010] 3 SCR 211.
108. Ibid.
109. R v Colarusso, [1994] 1 SCR 20 at 58, 110 DLR (4th) 297 [Colarusso] [emphasis added]
citing R v Dyment, [1988] 2 SCR 417 at 431, 55 DLR (4th) 503.
110. R v McBean, 2011 ONSC 878 at para 19, 92 WCB (2d) 878 citing Colarusso,
supra note 109.
111. Lowrey, supra note 59 at para 9.
112. Craig, supra note 61 at para 42
113. Ibid at paras 8-9, 45.
114. R v Sandhu, 2014 BCSC 2482, [2015] BCWLD 1274.
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of the sender’s expectations has no bearing on the analysis, because the police
acquired the information through a voluntary act of the recipient. In Sandhu,
as in Lowrey and Craig, section 8 was never triggered.
Although it is not tenable to say that the sender’s privacy interest vanishes
because of what the recipient might do with a piece of correspondence, it is a very
different matter when the recipient in fact shares it with others. That is precisely
why the “loss of control” argument has a superficial appeal: It correctly describes
what happens if the recipient actually decides to make the communication
available to others. If the recipient of a letter turns it over to the police, the
sender’s privacy interest has no bearing on the letter’s admissibility. There is no
reason to treat text messages differently.
Similarly, privacy interests are irrelevant when the police acquire evidence in
the course of a lawful search, such as a search incident to arrest. When evidence is
properly within the scope of such a search, its admissibility is not in question even
if the claimant can make out a heightened privacy interest. The proper scope of a
search incident to arrest has, of course, been vigorously debated, particularly with
respect to electronic communications, and it is important to stress that the search
must be narrowly tailored to meet only the purposes justifying such a search, which
include “collect[ing] and preserv[ing] evidence located at the site of the arrest”115
so long as the evidence is not “in … danger of disappearing.”116 In R v Fearon, the
Court noted that searches of cell phones, incident to arrest, “may serve important
law enforcement objectives” such as “identifying accomplices or locating and
preserving evidence that might otherwise be lost or destroyed.”117 In such cases,
the Court explained, the search should be limited to “recently sent or drafted
emails, texts, photos and the call log … as in most cases only those sorts of items
will have the necessary link to the purposes for which prompt examination of
the device is permitted.”118 Within that properly defined scope, a showing of a
heightened privacy interest as to a certain item makes no difference. When the
police conduct a search that is a valid exception to the warrant requirement, and
they do not stray outside the permissible scope of the search, any evidence they
collect is admissible, whether it is a bus transfer or a personal diary. Fearon notes
that email and text messages could fall within the scope of the search,119 and to

115.
116.
117.
118.
119.

R v Stillman, [1997] 1 SCR 607 at para 48, 144 DLR (4th) 193.
Ibid at para 49.
R v Fearon, supra note 20 at para 49.
Ibid at para 76.
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Stern, Textual

Privacy and Mobile Information 435

recognize that is to see that even if a particular text message carried a high privacy
interest, that would not be a reason for excluding it.
To say, then, that individuals have an objectively reasonable expectation of
privacy in letters, emails, and text messages, as a general matter, does not insulate
these materials from inspection by the police, even when a warrant is lacking.
If the recipient voluntarily turns it over to the police, or if the correspondence
comes into view during a search pursuant to arrest, for example, the claimant’s
privacy interest does not require the suppression of this evidence. The same
logic should apply when the police have reasonable suspicion to search for the
particular communication in question, as I show in the next Part.
F.

REASONABLE SUSPICION

In cases involving the privacy of text messages, the police of`ten discover the
incriminating information in the course of a search that was supported by reasonable
suspicion, though not by grounds sufficient for a warrant. While that standard
cannot justify a wide-ranging search of every message on a suspect’s phone, or even
all the recent messages, it can support a narrowly targeted search aimed solely at
obtaining messages relevant to a crime for which the police are investigating the
suspect. Allowing a relatively narrow search of this kind would go a long way towards
answering the concerns of the dissent in Marakah, which suggested that the majority’s
“all-encompassing approach” would result in the exclusion of text messages from
“a sexual predator who lures a child into committing sexual acts” and “an abusive
husband who sends harassing text messages to his ex-wife.”120 In these instances,
one may doubt that any search at all has occurred if the recipient chooses to turn
over the incriminating information rather than producing it at the behest of the
police, but even if these were treated as searches under section 8, the recipient’s
complaint would be sufficient to create reasonable suspicion as to the messages.
That was precisely the position that the Court adopted in R v Chehil, which
explained that a search of the claimant’s luggage, performed by a sniffer dog
that alerted to the presence of drugs, and supported by reasonable suspicion,
was “authorized by law.”121 The Court noted that such searches are “minimally
intrusive, narrowly targeted, and can be highly accurate,” and therefore they
“may be conducted without prior judicial authorization.”122 For the search to
be legally permissible, there must be a “nexus … between the criminal conduct
that is suspected and the investigative technique employed”—a requirement that
120. Marakah, supra note 1 at para 168 (Moldaver J, dissenting).
121. Chehil, supra note 16 at para 1.
122. Ibid.
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was satisfied in Chehil by “a constellation of facts that reasonably support[ed]
the suspicion of drug-related activity that the dog deployed [was] trained to
detect.”123 Having established reasonable suspicion to believe that the suspect
was engaged in drug trafficking, the police were authorized to conduct a limited
search aimed solely at detecting the presence of drugs.
Chehil reached that conclusion because the Court in Kang-Brown had created
a new common-law power to conduct such a search. As Justice Binnie explained,
“[i]n my view, where the police comply with the requirements of the Charter,
they possess the common law authority to make use of sniffer dogs in places
to which they have lawful access for the purpose of criminal investigations.”124
He concluded that “a sniffer-dog search is authorized by the common law, and
the common law itself is reasonable on the basis of reasonable suspicion,” because
of “the minimally intrusive, narrowly targeted and high accuracy” of such
a search.125 In creating such a common-law power, Justice Binnie added that
the Court was “ensuring that the common law reflects current and emerging
societal needs and values.”126 Ratifying this view, Justice Deschamps noted that
“the law enforcement duties traditionally recognized at common law are ‘the
preservation of the peace, the prevention of crime, and the protection of life and
property.’”127 Those considerations had previously furnished a proper basis, she
observed, for creating a common-law power to allow the police, on reasonable
suspicion, to conduct a “random vehicle stop, as part of a program to detect and
deter impaired driving,” and she reasoned that precisely the same grounds would
justify “the use of a sniffer dog by the police as an independent investigative tool,”
based on reasonable suspicion.128 Finally, drawing on the same considerations,
Justice Bastarache reasoned that where the police “were attempting to identify
and apprehend individuals carrying illegal drugs, weapons or other contraband
on Canada’s public transportation systems,” their use of sniffer dogs to pursue
those goals “falls within the scope of their lawful duties at common law.”129
For the police to have legal authority to search for text messages, in cases
involving conspiracies to distribute drugs, weapons, or similar contraband, in the
narrowly targeted fashion described above, would thus require an extension of
123.
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125.
126.
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Kang-Brown and Chehil. The rationales offered in those cases would readily justify
such an extension. The goals of these different kinds of searches are virtually
identical; as formulated here, the search of the phone would have to be as
“minimally intrusive, narrowly targeted and high[ly] accura[te]” as a sniffer dog
search; and ultimately the search would advance the same law enforcement duties,
traditionally recognized at common law, as in Kang-Brown and Chehil—namely,
“the preservation of the peace, the prevention of crime, and the protection of life
and property.”130 As with the dog-sniff cases, the effect would be to “ensur[e] that
the common law reflects current and emerging societal needs and values.”131
To date, applications of the “reasonable suspicion” standard have generally
involved questions of spatial rather than information privacy.132 Consequently,
analogies to informational privacy may seem awkward at first blush. There is no
evidently liminal position from which police may detect information, no exterior
of a phone or computer, where they may hover without touching, or while
touching only lightly. That view, however, confuses the superficial aspects of the
jurisprudence, as it has applied so far, with its underlying goals. Searches based
on reasonable suspicion are easiest to imagine (and to visualize) when they can be
characterized in physical terms, but the more basic point is that the search must
be limited and targeted, and must refrain from inquiring into information that is
not relevant to the search.
In explaining what constitutes reasonable suspicion, courts have explained
that although it falls short of reasonable and probable grounds, it nevertheless
depends on “objectively ascertainable facts.”133 In R v M(A), Justice Binnie
elaborated on the “narrowly targeted” nature of the search:
[T]he dog’s communication capacity is limited to a positive alert or a failure to
react at all. Unlike a wiretap or a physical search, the police do not obtain a lot of
information about a suspect that is not relevant to their specific drug inquiry. While
the suspect has a privacy interest in the place where the drugs are concealed, the fact
that the sniff will disclose nothing except the presence of illegal drugs in that private
place is a factor weighing in favour of moving the balance point to the reasonable
suspicion standard.134

130. Dedman, supra note 127 at 32.
131. Kang-Brown, supra note 15 at para 62 citing R v Mann, 2004 SCC 52 at para 17, [2004] 2
SCR 59 and Duarte, supra note 74 at 670.
132. For instance, besides the use of sniffer dogs to detect drugs in lockers, the courts have used
this standard to justify a frisk or pat-down. See note 17 and the accompanying text above.
133. Kang-Brown, supra note 15 at para 75.
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438

(2018) 55 OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL

Analogously, reasonable suspicion would permit the police to look only for
messages received from other particular individuals who have already been
identified as suspects, or messages received within a narrow time frame, specified
in advance, which the police have identified as a period during which the suspects
were planning or committing the crime. Any messages not relevant to the crime
under investigation are irrelevant and should be excluded, and if the search for
messages from other, previously identified suspects yields no results, the question
of false positives does not even arise.
In R v M(A), Justice Binnie acknowledged that “the suspect has a privacy
interest in the place where the drugs are concealed,” but he did not conclude
that reasonable suspicion was insufficient to overcome that interest.135 Rather,
he proposed that reasonable suspicion afforded the right “balance point”
for the kind of limited search he described.136 In R v Melesko, similarly, the
court observed that “a reasonable suspicion standard may be sufficient where
the investigative technique is relatively non-intrusive and the expectation of
privacy not too high.”137 Thus, to say that individuals have the same reasonable
expectation of privacy in all forms of written communication—letters, emails,
and text messages—does not necessarily translate into the consequence that none
of them are available to the police unless they are acting under a warrant or an
exception to the warrant requirement. In most instances, none of the factors
in Plant will apply to create a heightened privacy interest. This is particularly
true for most communications sent between individuals who are conspiring to
commit a crime. The interest that attaches, then, is the basic privacy interest
applicable to written communication as a general matter. That interest would
bar the police from undertaking random and groundless searches, in the hope of
finding evidence of criminality. Consequently, this approach would insulate the
vast majority of such communications from any police search, while permitting
the police to search only when they have objectively ascertainable facts as to a
specific crime, and as to specific individuals.
Pelucco and Marakah offer appropriate settings for the use of this standard.
In both cases, the police had objective grounds, short of reasonable and probable
grounds, to search the suspects’ phones for text messages related to the crimes
under investigation. In both cases, the police appear to have conducted a
minimally intrusive and appropriately targeted search, aimed only at the messages
relating to those crimes. In both cases, the Crown contended that text messages
135. Ibid.
136. Ibid.
137. R v Melesko, 2010 ABPC 384 at para 158, [2011] AWLD 872.
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are categorically exempt from protection under section 8, and therefore did not
propose any alternative ground for admissibility, such as that the evidence was
admissible under the standard of “reasonable suspicion.” Going forward, the
adoption of this approach would give the public greater security in the privacy
of their communication, while also giving the police clear guidance on how to
conduct a Charter-compliant search for electronic communications.

V. CONCLUSION
Despite the Court’s effort to craft a categorical approach to the treatment of text
messages in Marakah, the judgment rests on several considerations that leave
future cases dependent on the particular circumstances that arise. Moreover,
on Marakah’s reasoning, the circumstances that drive the outcome are not
grounded in normative concerns that help to explain why most people would
attach a high privacy value to written correspondence of nearly any kind.
A simpler approach, based on social norms, would only offer better protection
for text messages while giving the law more predictability. At the same time,
a standard of reasonable suspicion for a limited search—akin to the sniffer dog
searches permitted by Kang-Brown and Chehil—would enhance the ability of
police to conduct investigations without jeopardizing the privacy status of text
messages as a general matter. Some might contend that an even more purely
categorical approach—endowing all text messages with a privacy interest and
refusing to permit any warrantless searches—would be even more desirable.
While that view has some plausibility, the jurisprudence applying the standard of
reasonable suspicion offers a well-developed basis for an approach that achieves
largely the same goals, while also adapting the common law to “current and
emerging societal needs and values,” in a fashion that answers the needs of the
police while also protecting the public.

